Understanding the Lion For Real

Final version forthcoming in (eds.) A. Marques & N. Venturinha, Knowledge, Language and Mind: Wittgenstein's Thought in Progress (Berlin: de Gruyter), 2012.

A longer book-length treatment will subsequently be published as Wittgenstein's Lion.


Comments welcome

Motivated by the Gods: On Psychoanalysing Ancient Tragedy

Early draft, feedback welcome.

Can Action Explanations Ever Be Non-Factive?

Final version forthcoming in (eds.) David Bakhurst, Brad Hooker, and Margaret Little,Thinking About Reasons: Essays in Honour of Jonathan Dancy (Oxford University Press).

Please do not quote from these pre-proofs.

The Public Expression of Penitence

Forthcoming in Teorema, in a special section on Christopher Bennett's The Apology Ritual, edited by Edgar Maraguat.

Please do not quote from these pre-proofs.

This paper critically explores the expressivist understanding of punishment which lies at the heart of Christopher Bennett’s book The Apology Ritual. There seems to be a tension in Bennett’s simultaneous treatment of offenders as people who are, on the one hand, being offered the opportunity to exercise their right to make amends and, on the other, being sentenced for the sake of an appropriate expression of their condemnation. I propose instead that state-inflicted punishment cannot easily
serve a purging function, that offenders do not need it to redeem themselves, and that it does not automatically bestow redemption on the unrepentant as a matter of course.
If, as Bennett seems to suggest, the ‘right to punishment’ is to include an ethical dimension, it cannot simply be a right to suffer for one’s deeds, for the ethically appropriate reaction to crime must also respect one’s right to be recognised as the criminal
that one is, and be given a chance to make public amends for it.

The Objects of Action Explanation

Submitted version (please do not quote). Final version to appear in Ratio Vol. XXV, No. 3, September 2012

This paper distinguishes between various different conceptions of behaviour and action before exploring an accompanying variety of distinct things that „action explanation‟ may plausibly amount to viz. different objectives of action explanation. I argue that a large majority of philosophers are guilty of conflating many
of these, consequently offering inadequate accounts of the relation between actions and our reasons for performing them. The paper ends with the suggestion that we would do well to opt for a pluralistic understanding of action and its explanations.

A Just Medium: Empathy and Detachment in Historical Understanding

Please do not quote from proofs. Final version published in the Journal of the Philosophy of History Vol 5, No 2 (2011) 179–200.

This paper explores the role of empathy and detachment in historical explanation by comparing Collingwood and Hume's philosophies of history to Brecht and Stanislavki's theories of theatre. I argue that Collingwood's notion of re-enactment shares much more with Hume and Brecht than it does with Stanislavski. This enables a just medium between rationalistic and empathetic accounts of historical understanding, as recently put forth by Mark Bevir and Karsten Stueber respectively.

The Meaning of Hume's Necessary Connexions

Final version published in (eds.) K. Allen & T. Stoneham, Causation and Modern Philosophy (Routledge); please do not quote from these pre-proofs which are significantly different from the final version

In this paper I argue that the contemporary debate about how to best interpret Hume’s remarks on causation fails to take his empiricist account of meaning seriously. Hume takes the notion of causation to include that of ‘physical necessity’, adding that (given the theory of ideas) all we could possibly mean by the latter term is ‘the constant conjunction of objects, along with the determination of the mind’. So understood, necessity is something whose existence can be verified empirically, but we should resist the temptation to position Hume within an realist/anti-realist debate in metaphysics, which he would deem meaningless.

Action, Reason, and the Passions

Forthcoming in A. Bailey & D. O' Brien, Continuum Companion to Hume.
Pre-proofs (please don't cite).

The Experimental Turn and Ordinary Language

Essays in Philosophy: Vol. 11: Iss. 2,181-96.

Experimental philosophy has been thought by some to represent an improvement over ordinary language philosophy, in particular, a broadening of its evidence base beyond the single philosopher consulting his or her own intuitions to the statistically significant
sample drawn from the general population. In his essay, “The Experimental Turn and Ordinary Language", Constantine Sandis challenges this view, arguing that the methods of experimental philosophy are not suited to deliver the sorts of results wanted by the ordinary language philosopher. According to Sandis, ordinary language philosophy is concerned with the norms that govern linguistic usage whereas experimental philosophy is concerned with psychological explanations of why people have the
intuitions they do. The two movements, therefore, do not share the same goal.

Hegel and Contemporary Philosophy of Action

Co-authored with Arto Laitinen. Final version published in our 'Hegel on Action' volume. Please do not quote from proofs.

While preliminary steps towards fruitful dialogue between Hegel scholars and those working in the philosophy of action have been taken, many paths remain uncharted. This essay serves as both a summative document of past interaction and a promissory note of things to come. We begin with some general words regarding thephilosophy of action before singling out reasons for exploring Hegel’s thought in relation to it.We next present a brief overview of studies conducted to this day, followed by a thematic appraisal of the contributions appearing in the other essays in this volume, whose aim is to provide an in-depth account of Hegel’s writings on human action as they relate to contemporary concerns in the hope that it will encourage further dialogue.

The Man Who Mistook his Handlung for a Tat: Hegel on Oedipus and other Tragic Thebans

Final version in Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 62 (Winter 2010);please don't quote from pre-proofs

This essay challenges the popular view that we can find in Hegel a theory of tragedy according to which it results from a conflict of ethical claims which the Greeks took to be absolute. I maintain that Hegel's notion of tragedy can only be understood from within the framework of his philosophy of action. In so doing I re-examine the moral significances of Hegel's distinction between Handlung and Tat, comparing it to accounts of intentional action offered by Ross, Anscombe, and Davidson. This results in a new understanding of what makes an action tragic, one in which agential responsibility is too fragile to be straightforwardly inferred from behaviour.

Hume and the Debate on Motivating Reasons

Uncorrected proof

Please do not quote from proofs.  Final version published in (ed. Charles Pigden), Hume on Motivation and Virtue (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009)

Dretske on the Causation of Behavior

Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 71-85 (2008). Reprinted in May 2009 annual.

In two recent articles and his earlier book Fred Dretske appeals to a distinction between triggering and structuring causes with the aim of establishing that psychological explanations of behavior differ from non-psychological ones. He concludes that intentional human behavior is triggered by electro-chemical events but structured by representational facts. In this paper I argue that although this underrated position is far more persuasive and sophisticated than the standard Davidsonian alternative, Dretske’s account fails to provide us with a coherent analysis of intentional action and its explanation.

Gods and Mental States: The Causation of Action in Ancient Tragedy and Modern Philosophy of Mind

Uncorrected pre-proofs.

Please do not quote from proofs. For final version see New Essays on The Explanation of Action (ed. C. Sandis), Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp.358-385

In Conversation with Nassim Nicholas Taleb

Pre-Proof. (with Nassim Nicholas Taleb)

Please don't quote from proofs.

For final version see above link to 'Philosophy Now', Sep/Oct 2008 p24ff.

The Explanation of Action in History

Sandis, Constantine (2006) "The Explanation of Action in History," Essays in Philosophy: Vol. 7: Iss. 2, Article 12.
Available at: http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/vol7/iss2/12

This paper focuses on two conflations which frequently appear within the philosophy of history and other fields concerned with action explanation. The first of these, which I call the Conflating View of Reasons, states that the reasons for which we perform actions are reasons why (those events which are) our actions occur. The second, more general conflation, which I call the Conflating View of Action Explanation, states that whatever explains why an agent performed a certain action explains why (that event which was) her action occurred. Both conflations ignore the fact that there are at least two distinct objects that legitimately qualify as objects of action explanation2. As Jennifer Hornsby (1993) has previous suggested, one thing we might wish to explain is ‘why did A do what she did?’ another is, ‘why did the event of her doing it occur?’

I shall argue that when these two views are combined they give rise to a futile debate about explanation in the philosophies of history and the social sciences, and to an almost identical debate in moral psychology and the philosophy of mind. In so doing, I shall also examine a proposed distinction between explaining a phenomenon, and rendering it intelligible. I conclude by distinguishing between four different objects of historical understanding, each of which is to be understood in the light of the aforementioned distinctions between event and thing done, and explanation and intelligibility.

Dancy Cartwright: Particularism in the Philosophy of Science

Acta Analytica, Volume 21: 2, Issue 39 (May) 2006.

This paper aims to explore the space of possible particularistic approaches to Philosophy of Science by examining the differences and similarities between Jonathan Dancy’s moral particularism—as expressed in both his earlier writings (e.g., Moral Reasons, 1993), and, more explicitly defended in his book Ethics without Principles (2004)—and Nancy Cartwright’s particularism in the philosophy of science, as defended in her early collection of essays, How the Laws of Physics Lie (1983), and her later book, The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science (1999). I shall argue that Dancy’s particularism is more radical, but also more plausible, than Cartwright’s, concluding that we have good reason to embrace a scientific particularism that is far closer to Dancy’s ethical particularism than any view defended by Nancy Cartwright, or any other philosopher from the ‘Stanford school’ of scientific theory.

In Defence of Four Socratic Doctrines

Uncorrected proofs

Please do not quote from proofs.

For final version (including replies by John Shand and James Warren) see Think, Spring/summer 2008,pp. 85-98

Basic Actions and Individuation

Attached version is significantly different from the published version (so please don't quote from it).

For final version please see:

Sandis, C. (2010) Basic Actions and Individuation, in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action (eds T. O'Connor and C. Sandis), Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, UK. doi: 10.1002/9781444323528.ch2

Contextualist Vs. Analytic History of Philosophy

'Think', vol.20 Summer 2009, pp.101-105 (uncorrected proofs)

A response to replies (to 'In Defence of Four Socratic Doctrines') by James Warren and John Shand.

How to Act Against Your Better Judgement

Unocrrected Proofs, please do not quote (for example the references to 'Charles Taylor' are actually to Christopher Taylor!) Final version available here: Philosophical Frontiers 3.2 (2008). Reprinted in commemorative book (2009)

Those who object to Donald Davidson’s understanding of how so-called weakness of the will is possible tend to argue that he is in some way committed to claiming that the weak-willed agent holds contradictory judgements in deliberation. In this paper I try to refine the more ambiguous aspects of Davidson’s account in the light of some such objections, with the hope of showing that there is nothing paradoxical in what Davidson says. This refinement points to a different kind of weakness in Davidson’s account, namely that it only deals with the kind of akrasia which Aristotle referred to as propeteia, when the case that is meant to me truly puzzling case is that of astheneia. I next argue that despite the failings of his explanation - which stem from his motivation internalism - Davidson’s theory is essentially equipped with the right distinctions to show how astheneia may be possible after all.
Share

Hitchcock's Conscious Use of Freud's Unconscious

Europe's Journal of Psychology, August 2009

This paper explores Alfred Hitchcock’s use of Freudian psychoanalysis in a number of his films, with particular emphasis on Spellbound (1945), Psycho (1960), and Marnie (1964). I argue that the films (and related primary source material) demonstrate that Hitchcock was largely unconvinced of the validity of psychoanalytic theory and practice which he frequently mocked, both on-screen and off. Nonetheless, he greatly appreciated the magnetism of the psychoanalytic process and general charm of Freud’s conceptual world. It is for this reason that he kept returning to Freudian aesthetics throughout his cinematic career. Indeed, understanding how Hitch came to master this love/hate relationship is the key to understanding when and why the films succeed, as well as where and how they fail. The paper ends with an analogy between Hitchcock’s attitude to Freud and that of Ludwig Wittgenstein with the further aim of evaluating some of Freud’s most significant ideas.

Two Tales of One City: Cultural Understanding and the Parthenon Scupltures

Museum Management and Curatorship, Vol. 23, No. 1, March 2008,5-21

Comments by Ford. W. Bell, Neil G.W. Curtis, B.L. Murphy, and Anthony M. Snodgrass.

Followed by by reply: "universal museums and the Parthenon sculptures"

The New Acropolis Museum

When did the Killing Occur?: Donald Davidson on Action Individuation

Δαι´μων. Revista de Filosofía, nº 37, 2006, 179-183

English: According to Donald Davidson’s
method of action individuation, killings occur
before the death of the victim. In this paper I shall
argue against this counter intuitive view but also
against its most popular rival, the view that
killings do not occur until the time of the victim’s
death (by which point the killer may be doing
something else, or even be deceased), as well as
Ruth Weintrub’s recent suggestion that killings
cannot be located temporally at all. Instead, I
shall claim that while we can locate killings
spatiotemporally, we cannot do so with the same
degree of precision that we can locate other
events (e.g. shootings). In so doing, I shall also be
arguing (contra Weintrub) that the causing of an
event may itself be conceived of as an event.

Spanish: Según el método de individuación de acciones de Donald Davidson, los asesinatos tienen lugar antes de la muerte de la víctima. En este artículo critico esta tesis tan antiintuitiva pero también su rival más popular, la de que los asesesinatos no tienen lugar hasta el momento de la muerte de la víctima (en el cual el asesino puede estar haciendo algo distinto o incluso haber fallecido), así como la reciente sugerencia de Ruth Weintraub de que los asesinatos no pueden ubicarse temporalmente en absoluto. En lugar de ello, defenderé que, mientras que podemos ubicar los asesinatos espaciotemporalmente, no podemos hacerlo con el mismo grado de precisión con que ubicamos otros sucesos (p.e. los disparos). De este modo, defenderé (frente a Weintraub) que la causación de un suceso puede ser concebida a su vez como un suceso.

The Very Best of Michael Smith

Published in Metapsychology,Vol. 11, Iss. 10, 2007.

Review of Michael Smith's Ethics and the A Priori

Audible Lessons in Self

Trying to make sense of the Dalai Lama's version of Buddhism

Review of "I am a Strange Loop" by Douglas R. Hofstadter

Pre-Proof.

Please do not quote from proofs.

For final version see Times Higher Education Supplement,25 May, 2007.

Review of 'The Inner Touch: Archeology of a Sensation' by Daniel Heller-Roazen

Pre-Proof.

Please do not quote from proofs.

For final version see Times Higher, Nov 2, 2007.

Bad Arguments: They Live Amongst Us!

Pre-proof.

Please do not quote from proofs.

Final version printed in Dialogue, Issue 29, November 2007..

Book Review: GP BAKER and PMS HACKER, Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning Parts I (Essays) and II (Exegesis §§ 1—184).(Volume 1 of An …

Review of" Philosophy of History: A Guide for Students"

Essays in Philosophy Vol. 8, No. 2, June 2007

Review of:

Philosophy of History: A Guide for Students, by M.C. Lemon. Routledge (2003), 480pp. ISBN 0-415-
16204-1 (Hardback: $125); ISBN 0-415-16205-x (Paperback $31.95)

Review of Maria Alvarez's Kinds of Reasons

Ratio, Volume 24, Issue 2, pages 222–226, June 2011

Jessica Brown, Anti-Individualism and Knowledge

Minds and Machines
Volume 18, Number 1, 145-146, DOI: 10.1007/s11023-008-9092-8

Review of:

Jessica Brown, Anti-Individualism and Knowledge
MIT Press, 2004, 339 + xiv pp, 62 (Cloth), ISBN 0-262-02558-2;62(Cloth)ISBN0−262−02558−2;25 (Paperback), ISBN 0-262-02558-2

Review of" The Literary Wittgenstein"

Sandis, Constantine (2006) "Review of “The Literary Wittgenstein”," Essays in Philosophy: Vol. 7: Iss. 1, Article 13.

This book review is available in Essays in Philosophy: http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/vol7/iss1/13

Review of:

The Literary Wittgenstein, John Gibson and Wolfgang Huemer (eds.), Routledge: London, 2004, 368pp
(index, ix in Preface), $33.95 (pbk), ISBN 0415289734.

Book Review: Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action

Journal of Moral Philosophy, Volume 1, Number 2, 2004 , pp. 223-225(3)

Review of G.F. Schueler's Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action

Book Review The Lost Cause: Causation and the Mind-Body Problem by Celia Green. Oxford Forum, 2003, 235pp, ISBN 0-9536772-1-4. Reviewed by …

The Human Nature Review Human Nature Review 2003 Volume 3: 491-493 ( 17 November )

Sandis, C. (2003). Review of The Lost Cause: Causation and the Mind-Body Problem by Celia Green. Human Nature Review. 3: 491-493.

Animal Ethics

In Ethics: A University Guide
By Richard H. Corrigan & Mary E. Farrell (eds.)
Philosophical Frontiers Press.

Twists of Intent

Review of Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz

In Ethics, Vol. 116, No. 2 (January 2006), pp. 435-440

Reviewed work(s): Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz by Pettit, Philip; Scheffler, Samuel; Smith, Michael

Review of Hume's Scepticism and Realism: His Two Profound Arguments Against the Senses In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Review)

Review of Adam Morton's The Importance of Being Understood: Folk Psychology as Ethics

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003.09.13

Morton, Adam, The Importance of Being Understood: Folk Psychology as Ethics, Routledge, 2003, 225pp, $29.95 (pbk), ISBN 0415272432.

Reviewed by Constantine Sandis , University of Reading

Review of Stephen Mulhall's Philosophical Myths of the Fall

Philosophy for Younger People: A Polemic

Philosophical Pathways, Issue 96, 13th December 2004

Constantine Sandis from Reading University, UK promotes philosophy in British schools on behalf of the Royal Institute of Philosophy. In his polemic, he articulates the reasons why school students not only can but should study philosophy.

Alasdair MacIntyre, The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays (Vol. 1) Reviewed by

Alasdair MacIntyre, Ethics of Politics: Selected Essays (Vol. 2) Reviewed by

Issue Introduction: Love and Reasons

Book Review: Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith, eds., Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz :Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz

The Limits of Ignorance

Review of Rescher's book Ignorance